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Abstract
The availability of rich rm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new
evidence on the e¤ects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least produc-
tive rms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving rms to increase their innovation
e¤orts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we
propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these ndings. We intro-
ducing rm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent rms
operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework,
trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher
quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation
and productivity growth through a direct competition e¤ect, based on the increase in the
size of the market, and a selection e¤ect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards
more productive rms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and rm-level statistics, the model
predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent,
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1 Introduction
Following the observation that large and persistent productivity di¤erences exist among rms
within the same industry (e.g. Bartelsman and Doms, 2000), an interesting set of empirical
regularities about international trade has recently emerged from a large numbers of studies
using rm-level data. Firstly, strong evidence suggests that trade liberalization induces the
least productive rms to exit the market, reallocating both demand and resources to surviving,
more productive rms; this is the so-called selection e¤ect of trade resulting in an increase of
aggregate productivity (see e.g. Pavcnik, 2002, Topalova, 2004, and Tybout, 2003 for a survey).
A second line of research has focused on the innovation e¤ect of trade, by documenting the
role of rm heterogeneity in shaping the e¤ects of trade liberalization on innovation activities
and productivity growth. Bustos (2010) shows that a regional trade agreement, Mercosur, has
selected highly productive rms into exporting and a¤ected positively a broad set of innovation
measures (computers and software, technology transfers, R&D, and patents).1 Bloom, Draca,
and Van Reenen (2009) study the e¤ect of Chinese import penetration on innovation in European
countries. They nd evidence of both the selection and the innovation e¤ect of trade. On the one
hand Chinese competition decreases employment and rms chances of survival, and this e¤ect
is stronger for low-tech than for high-tech rms. On the other hand, surviving rms tend to
innovate more (patenting and R&D) and upgrade their technology (IT intensity). Aw, Roberts,
and Xu (2010) using plant-level Taiwanese data estimate a structural model of rms decision to
invest in R&D and enter the export market. They nd that a reduction in trade costs produces
a substantial increase in innovation and export, both resulting in a fairly persistent increase in
productivity growth.2
A third piece of evidence shows that trade liberalization has pro-competitive e¤ects that can
potentially lead to more selection and more innovation. Bugamelli, Fabiani, and Sette (2008)
using Italian rm-level manufacturing data nd that import competition from China has reduced
prices and markups in the period 1990-2004. Gri¢ th, Harrison, and Simpson (2008) have studied
the e¤ects of trade integration reforms carried out under the EU Single Market Programme and
found that these reforms have increased product market competition (measured as average
markups) and stimulated innovation (R&D expenditures). Chen, Imbs and Scott (2008) and
1Focusing on innovation has the advantage of identifying one specic channel through which improvements in
productivity take place. Other studies have instead estimated productivity as a residual in the production function,
with the consequence that together with technological di¤erences, residuals captures also other di¤erences such
as market power, factor market distortion, and change in the product mix. (see i.e. Foster, Haltowanger, and
Syverson, 2008, Hsieh and Klenow, 2008, and Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2008).
2Several papers have investigated the related but slighlty di¤erent question of whether the exporter status
implies a higher investment in innovation or technology upgrading: this has been called the learning by exporting
mechanism. The evidence is mixed: early papers, such as Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) and Bernard and
Jensen (1999) do not nd any evidence in favor of this mechanism. Recent studies have instead found evidence
that rms improve their productitivy subsequent to entry (e.g. Delgado, Farinas, and Ruano, 2002, De Loecker,
2006, Van Biesebroek, 2005, see Lopez, 2005, for a survey). The basic di¤erence between these studies and those
discussed in the main text is that the former focus on productivity and the latter on innovation. One exception is
Criuscolo, Haskel, and Slaugther (2008) which nds that expoters and multinational rms have higher productivity
because they both innovate more and learn from foreign technologies. The other di¤erence is that Bustos (2010),
Bloom et al (2008), and Llleiva and Treer (2008) focus on trade liberalization and not on export status.
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Corcos, Del Gatto, Ottaviano and Mion (2010) using micro data on EU countries estimate the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model and show that trade openness reduces average prices and
markups, while raising productivity through rm selection.
This paper presents a theoretical model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of
these empirical ndings. More precisely, we set up a model in which trade liberalization has pro-
competitive e¤ects, through reduced markups, leading to rm selection and increased innovation.
A dynamic industry model with heterogeneous rms is added to a growth model with innovation
by incumbents. There are two goods, a homogeneous good produced under constant returns,
and a di¤erentiated good produced with a continuum of varieties, each of them facing both
variable and xed production costs. As in Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003), productivity
di¤ers across varieties. Firms in the di¤erentiated good sector allocate labor to the production
of a specic variety and to innovation activities aimed at reducing their production costs. Each
variety is produced by a small number of identical rms, operating in an oligopolistic market;
thus quantities produced and innovation activities result both from the strategic interaction
among rms. The oligopolistic market structure and the cost-reducing innovation features are
borrowed from static trade models with endogenous market structure (e.g. Neary, 2009 and
2010, Eckel and Neary, 2010) and from multi-country growth models with representative rms
(e.g. Peretto, 2003 and Licandro and Navas 2007) respectively.
The open economy features two symmetric countries engaging in costly trade (iceberg type).
In order to simplify the analysis, the baseline version of the model assumes no entry costs into the
export market, implying that all operating rms export, and takes the number of oligopolistic
producers as given. In an extended version of the model, we remove these assumptions and show
that the main mechanisms behind our results are still at work. When the economy moves from
autarky to free trade, product market competition increases since the number of rms operating
in each local market doubles. This produces a reduction in the markup and a decrease in
the ine¢ ciency of oligopolistic markets, ultimately leading to an expansion of the quantities
produced by rms. Since innovation is cost-reducing, the trade-induced increase in the market
size increases rmsincentive to innovate. We call this the direct competition e¤ect. Moreover,
a decline in the markup raises the productivity cuto¤ and moves the least productive rms
out of the market. This selection e¤ect reallocates resources from exiting to surviving rms,
increasing their average size and their incentive to invest in cost-reducing innovation. Hence,
trade-induced rm selection increases not only the levelof aggregate productivity (as in Melitz,
2003) but also rmsinnovation, a¤ecting the growth rateof productivity as well. We call this
new mechanism the selection e¤ect of competition. Incremental trade liberalization (reduction
in the iceberg trade cost) has similar e¤ects. The direct e¤ect can be obtained even in a model
with representative rms, as shown in Peretto (2003) and Licandro and Navas (2007), while the
new channel highlighted in this paper is strictly dependent on the presence of heterogeneous
rms.
Finally, the baseline model is calibrated to match salient rm-level and aggregate statistics
of the US economy, showing a su¢ ciently good t of the data. It shows that a reduction in trade
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costs has a quantitatively relevant selection e¤ect of competition on innovation. Precisely, a 10
percent reduction in trade costs increases the aggregate growth rate by about 13 percent, a big
share of which (about 96 percent) comes from selection and the rest from the direct competition
e¤ect. Extensive sensitivity analysis shows that this growth decomposition is fairly robust to
changes in parameters value, with the selection e¤ect systematically accounting for more than
90 percent of the overall growth e¤ect of trade. This suggests that the selection channel, which
represents the main innovation of our paper is quantitatively relevant.
This paper is related to the emerging literature on the joint e¤ect of trade liberalization on
selection and innovation. A rst line of research introduces a one-step technological upgrading
choice into a heterogeneous rm framework. Examples are Yeaple (2005), Costantini and Melitz
(2007), Bustos (2010), Navas and Sala (2007) and Vannoorenberge (2008). In all these papers,
with the exception of Costantini and Melitz, the model economy is static. Our paper is more
closely related to a second stream of research that introduces innovation as a continuous process
in dynamic models of trade and productivity growth. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and
Gusta¤son and Segerstrom (2008) explore the e¤ects of trade liberalization on innovation and
growth in models of expanding product variety (Romer, 1990) with heterogeneous rms. They
show that the e¤ect of trade-induced rm selection on innovation and growth depends on the form
of (international) knowledge spillovers characterizing the innovation technology. Atkeson and
Burnstein (2010) set up a model of process and product innovation with rm heterogeneity and
show that trade has positive e¤ects on process innovation that can be o¤set by negative e¤ects on
product innovation.3 Although di¤ering in the innovation type or in the innovation technology
they analyze, all these papers adopt a monopolistically competitive market structure.4
The key distinguishing feature of our model is that it focuses on the interactions between
trade, rm heterogeneity and innovation in an dynamic oligopolistic environment. In this frame-
work, the market structure is endogenous and responds to changes in trade costs, thereby repre-
senting the ideal environment to analyze the e¤ects of trade on product market competition (the
third stylized fact discussed above). Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that under a particular
form of preferences it is possible to obtain endogenous markups in the monopolistic competitive
framework. In line with our result, they nd that trade liberalization produces a pro-competitive
e¤ect (lower markups) and triggers the selection of the least productive rms out of the market.5
3Benedetti (2009) nds positive e¤ects of trade liberalization on both types of innovation. Klette and Kortum
(2004) and Mortensen and Lentz (2008) introduce a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous rms into a
quality ladder growth model (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). They limit the analysis to the interaction between
rm heterogeneity and creative destruction in closed economy, without exploring the e¤ects of trade. Haruyama
and Zhao (2008) explore the interaction between trade liberalization, selection and creative destruction in a quality
ladder model of growth. Stolting (2010) analyzes trade openness on an endogenous growth model of selection and
imitation, as in Luttmer (2007) and Gabler and Licandro (2010).
4One exception is Van Long, Ra¤ and Stahler (2008) that features an oligopolistic market structure, but
innovation is not a continuos process and the model is static.
5The presence of endogenous markups allows the selection e¤ect to work through a channel di¤erent from that
highlighted in Melitz (2003). In that paper, trade liberalization produces an increase in labor demand that bids
up wages and forces low productivity rms to exit. In our paper, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the selection
e¤ect is produced by the reduction in markups brought about by trade liberalization. While there is evidence, as
discussed above, that trade liberalization has increased product market competition, the trade-induced increase
in average wages triggering rm selection in Melitz (2003) seems less in line with the data. For instance March
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Our model di¤ers from that of Melitz and Ottaviano not only for the di¤erent source of endoge-
nous markups but also because in their model there is no innovation activity aimed at improving
productivity, therefore they cannot study the implications of rm heterogeneity and endogenous
markups for innovation. Bernard, Jensen, Eaton, and Kortum (2003), set up a Ricardian model
with Bertrand competition among rms and obtain markups responding endogenously to trade
liberalization. We complement their analysis by introducing innovation and deriving endogenous
markups from Cournot competition. Finally, we contribute to the literature on oligopoly and
trade (e.g. Neary, 2003, Eckel and Neary, 2009, Venables, 1985, and Horstman and Markusen,
1986) introducing heterogeneous rms and innovation-driven growth.
Summing up, to our knowledge the present paper is the rst to provide a framework to
interpret jointly the three stylized facts discussed above. The basic structure of the model is
such that trade a¤ects both rm selection and innovation through the competition channel, that
is through its e¤ect on the markup. The selection e¤ect of trade operating through endogenous
markups resulting from oligopolistic competition among rms is a novel contribution. Secondly,
while the direct competition e¤ect of trade on innovation is not new in the literature (see Peretto,
2003, and Licandro and Navas, 2007), the interaction between rm selection and innovation
represents an original contribution of this paper.
2 The model
2.1 Economic environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical consumers of measure one. Time is
continuous and denoted by t, with initial time t = 0. Preferences of the representative consumer
are 1Z
0
(lnXt +  lnYt) e t dt;
with discount factor  > 0. There are two types of goods: a homogeneous good, taken as the
numeraire, and a di¤erentiated good. Consumers are endowed with a unit ow of labor, which
can be transformed one-to-one into the homogeneous good. This implies that equilibrium wages
are equal to one. The amount Y of the labor endowment is allocated to homogeneous good
production, which enters utility with weight  > 0.
The di¤erentiated good X is produced with a continuum of varieties of endogenous mass
Mt 2 [0; 1], according to
Xt =
0@MtZ
0
xjt dj
1A
1

; (1)
where xjt represents variety j, and 1= (1  ) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties,
with  2 (0; 1). Each variety in X is produced by n identical rms using labor to cover a xed
CPS data show that both median and average US wages have stagnated in the last three decades, a period of
progressive trade liberalization (see Acemoglu, 2002)
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production cost  > 0 and variable cost.6 The variable cost, and hence rm productivity, di¤er
across varieties. A rm with productivity ~zt has the following production technology
~z t qt +  = yt; (2)
where y represent inputs and q production (we omit index j and identify the variety with its
productivity). Variable costs are assumed to be decreasing in the rms state of technology with
 > 0.
Innovation activities are undertaken by incumbents according to the following technology
_~zt = Az^tht; (3)
where h represents labor allocated to innovation and A > 0 is an e¢ ciency parameter. An ex-
ternality z^, which will be dened later, a¤ects the productivity of the innovation technology. We
assume, for simplicity, that all rms producing the same good have the same initial productivity
~z0 > 0.
Irrespective of their productivity, varieties exit the market at rate  > 0. Exiting varieties
are replaced by new varieties in order for the mass of operative varieties to remain constant at
the steady-state equilibrium. Below we derive the equilibrium, restricting the analysis to the
steady state.
2.2 Households
The representative household maximizes utility subject to its instantaneous budget constraint.
The corresponding rst order conditions are
Y = E; (4)
_E
E
= r    = 0; (5)
pjt =
E
Xt
x 1jt ; (6)
where r is the interest rate and pjt is the price of good j. Total household expenditure on the
composite good X is
E =
MZ
0
pjtxjt dj:
Because of log preferences, total spending in the homogeneous good is  times total spending
in the di¤erentiated good. Equation (5) is the standard Euler equation implying r =  at the
stationary equilibrium, and (6) is the inverse demand function for variety j 2 [0; 1]. Variables
Y;E;M are also constant at steady state (index t is then omitted to simplify notation).
6Perfect substitution is implicitly assumed among the n goods belonging to a particular variety. In a more
general framework, the degree of substitution across these n goods may be nite even if it must be larger than
the degree of substitution across varieties. Introducing another degree of imperfect substitutability across goods
would complicate notation without adding any key insights.
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2.3 Production and Innovation
Firms producing the same variety behave non-cooperatively and maximize the expected present
value of their net cash ow:
Vijs =
Z 1
s
ijt e
 (+)(t s) dt;
where ijt = (pijt   ~z ijt )qijt   hijt    are prots of rm i producing variety j. We solve this
di¤erential game focusing on Nash Equilibrium in open loop strategies. Let aijt = (qijt; hijt),
t  s, be a strategy for rm i producing j at time t. Let us denote by aij rm i strategy path
for quantities and innovation. At time s a vector of strategy path (a1j ; ::::; aij ; ::::::; anj) is an
equilibrium in market j if
Vijs(a1j ; ::::; aij ; ::::::; anj)  Vijs(a1j ; ::::; a0ij ; ::::::; anj)  0;
for all rms f1; 2; :::; ng, where in (a1j ; ::::; a0ij ; ::::::; anj) only rm i deviates from the equilibrium
path. The rst inequality states that rm i maximizes its value taking the strategy paths of the
others as givens, and the second requires rm is value to be positive.7
The characterization of the open loop Nash equilibrium proceeds as follows: a time s rm
producing a particular variety solves (let us suppress indexes i and j to simplify notation)
Vs = max
[qt;ht]
1
t=s
Z 1
s
h
(pt   ~z t )qt   ht   
i
e (+)(t s) dt; st: (7)
pt =
E
Xt
x 1t
xt = x^t + qt
_~zt = A z^t ht
~zs > 0:
In a Cournot game a rm takes as given the path of its competitorsproduction x^t, the path
of the externality z^t, as well as the path of the aggregates E and Xt, and the exogenous exit
7We choose the open loop equilibrium because it is easier to derive in closed form solution. The drawback
of focusing on the open loop equilibriun is that it does not generally have the property of subgame perfection,
as rms choose their optimal time-paths strategies at the initial time and stick to them forever. In closed loop
and in feedback strategies, instead, rms do not pre-commit to any path and their strategies at any time depend
on the whole past history. The Nash equilibrium in this case is strongly time-consistent and therefore sub-game
perfect. Unfortunately, closed loop or feedback equilibria generally do not allow a closed form solution and often
they do not allow a solution at all. The literature on di¤erential games has uncovered classes of games in which
the open loop equilibrium degenerates into a closed loop and therefore is subgame perfect (e.g. Reingaum, 1982,
Fershtman, 1987, and Cellini and Lambertini, 2005). A su¢ cient condition for the open loop Nash equilibrium to
be subgame perfect is that in the rst order conditions for a rm the state variable of other rms do not appear.
In our model this condition is violated because of the externality in the innovation technology leading to the FOC
(9) below. Although, none of the basic results of this paper depend of this externality, removing it complicates
the solution of the model substantially.
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rate . The rst order conditions for the problem above are,
~z t = 
E
Xt
x 1t| {z }
pt
; (8)
1 = vtAz^t; (9)
 ~z  1
vt
qt =
  _vt
vt
+ + ; (10)
where vt is the costate variable. From (8), rms charge a markup over marginal costs, with
  (n  1 + ) =n, being the inverse of the markup. This is the well known result in Cournot-
type equilibria that the markup depends on the perceived demand elasticity, which is a function
of both the demand elasticity and the number of competitors.
Firms producing the same variety are assumed to face the same initial conditions, resulting
in a symmetric equilibrium with xt = nqt. As shown in the appendix, substituting (8) into (1)
we obtain the demand for variable inputs
~z t qt = e
z
z
(11)
where e  E=nM is expenditure per rm, z is a measure of rm detrended productivity, z 
(~zt e
 gt)^, with ^  = (1  ), and g is the growth rate of productivity that will be dened
below. Average detrended productivity is
z  1
M
MZ
0
zj dj:
Notice that the amount of resources allocated to a rm in (11) is the product of average expen-
ditures per rm, the inverse of the markup and the relative productivity of the variety the rm
produces. When the environment becomes more competitive,  increases, prices lower, produced
quantities increase and rms demand more inputs.
The right-hand side of equation (10) represents the return to innovation. After substituting
v from (9), innovation returns become A(z^=~z)~z q. Since innovation is aimed at reducing
production costs, z q, an increase in quantities makes innovation activities more protable,
inducing rms to innovative more.
Let us now dene the externality z^,
z^ =
z
z
~z;
where by denition both the productivity ~z and the detrended productivity z are assumed to
represent the productivity of direct competitors, that is those producing the same variety. At
the symmetric equilibrium they are both equal to the corresponding productivity of the rm.8
Under this assumption, the growth rate of productivity
g 
_~z
~z
= Ae    ; (12)
8Notice that the externality z^, can be rewritten as z^ = z1 1=^egtz. This implies that the rst order condition
for control h, equation (9), depends on the state variable of direct competitors z; except for the case ^ = 1.
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is the same for all ~z. To obtain it, di¤erentiate (9) and substitute the resulting _v=v in (10), then
substitute vz^ from (9) using the denition of z^.
The particular assumption adopted for the externality z^ allows for the growth rate to be equal
across varieties, o¤setting the positive e¤ect that the relative productivity has on innovation
and growth. Recall that more productive rms produce more and have then larger incentives to
innovate. The externality has two components. First, there is a standard spillover e¤ect coming
from the productivity of direct competitors, as represented by ~z in the denition of z^. Second,
there is a catching-up e¤ect represented by the ratio z=z, introduced to o¤set the positive e¤ect
of the relative productivity on innovation. Equilibrium innovation for rm z can be derived
using (3), (12) and the denition of the externality,
h =

e 

+ 
A

z
z
; (13)
where innovation resources h are positively related to the rms relative productivity z=z. This
is consistent with the empirical evidence showing that more productive rms spend more in
innovation (e.g. Lentz and Mortensen, 2008, and Aw, Roberts, and Xu, 2010). The assumption
of increasing innovation di¢ culty implies that, although more productive rms innovate more,
all rm grow at the same rate in the steady-state equilibrium.9
In a stationary equilibrium, all rms grow at the same rate and, as a consequence, their
productivities grow at the same rate as the average productivity, meaning that their demand
for variable inputs, as described by (11), is constant along the balance growth path. More
importantly, the result that in a stationary equilibrium productivity grows at the same rate for
all rms implies that rms remain always in their initial position in the productivity distribution.
2.4 Exit
From the previous section, it can be easily shown that the cash ow is a linear function of the
relative productivity z=z
(z=z) = (1  ) ez=z  

e  + 
A

z=z| {z }
h
 : (14)
Produced quantities and innovation e¤ort depend both on the distance from average productivity
z=z. In the following, we assume  small enough such that 1 (1+) > 0, a su¢ cient condition
for prots to depend positively on z. Let us denote by z the stationary cuto¤productivity below
which varieties exit the market. At a stationary state, the cuto¤productivity makes rms prots
and rms value equal to zero, implying
e =

z=z   +A
1  (1 + ) : (EC)
9The assumption of increasing innovation di¢ culty is commonly used in R&D-driven growth models to elimi-
nate counterfactual scale e¤ects, and stationarize models with growing populations. Jones (1995) and Segertrom
(1998) among others, provide robust empirical evidence supporting the increasing di¢ culty assumption.
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We refer to it as the exit condition, a negative relation between e and z.10
Next, we assume that there is a mass of unit measure of potential varieties of whichM 2 [0; 1]
are operative. We also assume that at each period non operative varieties draw a productivity z
from an initial productivity distribution  (z), which is assumed to be continuous in (zmin;1),
with 0  zmin < 1. Let us denote by  (z) the stationary equilibrium density distribution
dened on the z domain. The endogenous exit process related to the cuto¤ point z implies
 (z) = 0 for all z < z. Since the equilibrium productivity growth rates are the same irrespective
of z, in a stationary environment, surviving rms remain always at their initial position in the
distribution  . Consequently, the stationary equilibrium distribution is (z) = f(z)=(1  (z)),
for z  z, where f is the density associated to the entry distribution  .
We can now write z as a function of z
z(z) =
1
1   (z)
1Z
z
zf(z) dz: (15)
Since varieties exit at the rate , stationarity requires
(1 M) (1   (z)) = M: (16)
This condition states that the exit ow, M , equals the entry ow dened by the number of
entrants, 1 M , times the probability of surviving, 1  (z). Consequently, the mass of operative
varieties is a function of the productivity cuto¤ z;
M(z) =
1   (z)
1 +     (z) : (OV)
It is easy to see that M is decreasing in z, going from 1=(1 + ) to zero.
Note that the entry distribution   is assumed to depend on detrended productivity z. This
assumption is crucial for the economy to be growing at a stationary equilibrium. Incumbent
rms are involved in innovation activities making their productivity grow at the endogenous rate
g. This makes the distribution of incumbent rms move permanently to the right. By dening
the entry distribution as a function of detrended productivity z, we allow the productivity
of entrants to grow on average at the same rate as that of incumbent rms. This is a form
of technological spillover or learning-by-doing from incumbents to new entrants, sustaining a
stationary equilibrium is a growing economy with exit and entry. A similar assumption has
been previously used to support a stationary equilibrium in models of random (exogenous)
growth with heterogeneous productivity such as Luttmer (2007), Poschke (2009) and Gabler
and Licandro (2007).
10Notice that problem (7) does not explicitly include positive cash ow as a restriction. By doing so and then
imposing the exit condition (EC), we implicitly forbid rms with z < z to innovate and potentially grow at some
growth rate smaller then g. If they were allowed to do so, they will optimally invest in innovation up to the point
in which the cash ow would be zero. In such a case, rms with initial productivity smaller than the cuto¤ value
will be growing at a rate smaller than g, moving to the left of the distribution and eventually exiting. Such an
extension would make the problem unnecessarily cumbersome without a¤ecting the main results.
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2.5 Stationary Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for the homogeneous good can be written as
n
Z M
0
(yj + hj) dj + Y = n
Z M
0

~z j qj + hj + 

dj + E = 1:
The total endowment of the homogeneous good is allocated to production of the composite
good and to innovation, as well as to production of the homogeneous good. The rst equality
is obtained substituting y from (2) and Y from (4). Let us change the integration domain from
sectors j 2 [0; 1] to productivities z 2 [z;1] and use (3), (11) and (12) to rewrite the market
clearing condition asZ 1
z

(1 + ) e z=z   + 
A
z=z + 

 (z) dz + e =
1
nM
:
Since
R1
z  (z) dz =
R1
z z=z  (z) dz = 1, after integrating over all sectors we obtain
e =
1
nM(z) +
+
A   
 + (1 + )
; (MC)
a positive relation between e and z.
The following assumption is needed to prove the existence of the stationary equilibrium.
Assumption 1 The entry distribution veries, for all z,
z(z)  z
z(z)
 1   (z)
zf(z)
; (a)
and the following parameter restrictions hold:
ze=zmin >
+ 
A
(b)
1 +  <
A

(c)
where
A =
(1+)L
n +
+
A (1 + )  

1 +  zezmin

(1+)L
n + 

ze
zmin
  1
 (17)
and ze is the average productivity at entry.
Assumption (a) makes z=z(z) increasing on z, thus the (EC) curve is decreasing in z.11
Assumption (b) makes the prot function (14) increasing in z. Assumption (c) guarantees that
the (EC) curves cuts the (MC) curves from above.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, there exits a unique interior solution (e; z) of (MC) and
(EC), with M determined by (OV).
11This assumption is similar to that needed in Melitz (2003) to make the exit condition (ZCP in the paper)
decreasing in z.
11
Proof. Since M is decreasing in z, the (MC) locus is increasing starting at
(1+)
n +
+
A   
 + (1 + )
;
when z = zmin, and going to innity when z goes to innity. Under Assumption 1(a), the
(EC) locus is decreasing, starting at
 zezmin  
+
A
1  (1 + ) ;
for z = zmin, and going to [  (+ )=A] = [1  (1 + )] when z goes to 1. Operating on
the denition of A, it can be proved that assumption (b) implies A < 1, which from Assumption
1(c) implies 1 +  < 1=. Under this last condition, it can be proved that Assumption 1(c) is
su¢ cient for the intercept of the (EC) curve be larger than the intercept of the (MC) curve,
which completes the proof. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the equilibrium.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Next, we provide a rst glance at the e¤ects of trade openness by analyzing the e¤ects of an
exogenous increase in product market competition, a reduction in the markup rate 1= which,
as   (n  1 + ) =n, can potentially be produced by either an increase in the substitutability
parameter , or by an increase in the number of rms n.
Proposition 2 An increase in  raises the productivity cuto¤ z, reduces the number of opera-
tive varietiesM (z), has an ambiguous e¤ect on the labor resources allocated to the homogeneous
sector e and increases the growth rate g.
Proof. Figure 1 shows the e¤ect of an increase in the degree of competition (reduction in the
markup 1=) on the equilibrium values of z and e. An increase in  shifts both the (EC) and the
(MC) curves to the right, thereby increasing the equilibrium productivity cuto¤ z. Depending
on the relative strengths of the shift of the two curves e can increase or decrease, but the average
growth rate g always increases. From (12), the e¤ect on g of a change on  is determined by its
e¤ect on e. Multiplying the market clearing condition (MC) by , we obtain e as a function
of  and M(z), and since in equilibrium M(z) is decreasing in , we can conclude that e is
increasing on .
Two mechanisms contribute to increasing growth, a direct e¤ect and a selection e¤ect of
competition. Let describe rst the direct competition e¤ect. In a Cournot equilibrium, an
increase in competition reduces markups and allows for an increase in produced quantities; this
can easily seen from (11) which shows that the quantity produced is positively related to . The
increase in quantities is feasible since the homogeneous good becomes relatively more expensive
(i.e. the relative e¢ ciency of the di¤erentiate sector increases), consumersdemand moves away
from it towards the composite good and resources are reallocated from the homogeneous to the
composite sector. Since the benets of cost-reducing innovation are increasing in the quantity
produced, the higher static e¢ ciency associated with lower markups a¤ects positively innovation
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and growth. This mechanism does not depend on rm heterogeneity: it is easy to check that
assuming away the dependence of M on z by setting M = 1, the equilibrium growth rate
derived from (MC) and (EC) becomes independent of the cuto¤ z, but still increasing on .
This direct e¤ect of competition on growth can in fact be found in representative rm models
of growth with endogenous market structure (see e.g. Peretto, 2003, and Licandro and Navas,
2007).
The selection e¤ect is instead specically related to the heterogeneous rms structure of
the model. The trade-induced reduction in the markup raises the productivity threshold above
which rms can protably produce, the cuto¤ z, thus forcing the least productive rms to exit
the market. As a consequence, market shares are reallocated from exiting to, more productive,
surviving rms, thereby increasing their market size and their incentive to innovate. There-
fore this selection e¤ect leads to higher aggregate productivity level and higher innovation and
productivity growth.12
3 Open economy
Consider a world economy populated by two symmetric countries with the same technologies,
preferences, and endowments as described in the previous section. We assume that trade costs
are of the iceberg type:  > 1 units of goods must be shipped abroad for each unit nally
consumed. Costs  can represent transportation costs or trade barriers created by policy. For
simplicity in the baseline model we do not assume entry costs in the export market, thus all
surviving rms sell both to the domestic and foreign markets.13
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
Since the two countries are perfectly symmetric, we can focus on one of them. Let qt and qt be
the quantities produced by a rm for the domestic and the foreign markets, respectively. Firms
solve a problem similar to that in closed economy (see appendix). The rst order conditions are:
~z t =

(  1) qt
xt
+ 1

pt
 ~z t =

(  1) qt
xt
+ 1

pt
1 = vtAz^t;
~z  1t
vt
(qt +  qt) =
  _vt
vt
+ + :
Variable x represents here the total output o¤ered in the domestic market by both local and
foreign rms. By symmetry it is equal to the total supply in the foreign market. Because of
12Notice that in this model the direct competition e¤ect of trade liberalization on innovation does not hold
if we eliminate the homogeneous good, because no reallocation of market shares would be possible. While the
selection e¤ect produced by the presence of rm heterogeneity would still hold because reallocation takes place
within varieties of the di¤erentiated product.
13Our main goal is to explain the interaction between trade, selection and innovation, and for this purpose
having rms partitioned by their export status is not necessary.
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the trade costs, rms face di¤erent marginal costs and set di¤erent markups for the domestic
and foreign markets. More interesting, under Cournot competition countries export and import
goods that are perfectly substitutable even at the cost of paying the variable trade cost.
In the appendix, we show that the rst two conditions above yield the following demand for
variable inputs
~z t (qt +  qt) = e z=z (18)
where ~z and z are dened as in autarky and
 =
2n  1 + 
n (1 + )2 (1  )

2 (1  n  ) + n (2   1) + (1  ) (19)
is the inverse of the average markup faced by a rm in both the domestic and foreign market.
Notice that  is decreasing in variable trade costs  , with  reaching its maximum value
max  (2n  1 + ) =2n when  = 1, the polar case of no iceberg trade costs; the autarky
value  = (n  1 + ) =n is reached when  =   n= (n+   1), the alternative polar case of
prohibitive trade costs implying that both economies do not have any incentive to trade.
Using the last two rst order conditions above and proceeding as in the closed economy, we
nd that the growth rate of productivity
g 
_~z
~z
= Ae     (20)
takes the same functional form as in the closed economy. Consequently, opening to trade only
a¤ects the equilibrium growth rate through changes in the markup. As in the closed economy
case, we focus on the characterization of the steady-state equilibrium. The productivity cuto¤
is determined by the exit condition
(z=z) = (1   ) e z=z  

e  + 
A

z=z| {z }
h
  = 0:
which yields
e =

z=z(z)   +A
1  (1 + )  : (EC
T )
Since rms compensate their losses in local market shares with their shares in the foreign market,
prots are only a¤ected by the change in the markup. Consequently, the exit condition has the
same functional form as in (EC) except for the  .
The market clearing condition, proceeding as in the closed economy, becomes
e =
1
nM(z) +
+
A   
 + (1 + ) 
: (MCT )
which is equal in all aspects to (MC) except for the markup, with  instead of . Equations
(ECT ) and (MCT ) yield the equilibrium (e; z) in the open economy, with M (z) determined
by (OV). The equilibrium growth is dened by (20).
14
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1 and for  2 [1;  ], there exists a unique interior solution
(e; ~z) of (MCT )-(ECT ).
Proof. At  = n=(n +    1) the markups under trade and autarky are equal,  = , and
the prohibitive level of trade costs is reached. Thus, for    rms do not have incentives to
export, and trade does not take place. For  <  the proof of existence and unicity is similar to
that in the closed economy, and we omit it for brevity.
3.2 Trade liberalization
When countries are symmetric, trade openness does not a¤ect rmsmarket shares because the
reduction in local market sales due to foreign competition is o¤set by increased participation
in the foreign market. For this reason, (MCT ) and (ECT ) are formally equivalent to (MC) and
(EC) except for . We can then apply proposition 2 to study the e¤ects of trade liberalization.
The economy with costly trade is characterized by a level of product market competition higher
than in autarky, with  > , due to the participation of foreign rms in the domestic market. A
larger number of rms in the domestic market raises product market competition, thus lowering
the markup rate. From the denition of  and the equilibrium value of  we obtain
    =  (1  )
2   n (   1)2 (n+   1)
n (1 + )2 (1  ) ; (teta di¤)
which is positive for any non-prohibitive level of trade costs ( < ). Di¤erentiating the ex-
pression above it is easy to see that the distance between  and  is decreasing in  , which
implies that  is decreasing in  (see appendix). Hence we have two results, rst, when a
country goes from autarky to costly trade, it experiences an increase in product market compe-
tition. Secondly, incremental trade liberalization increases product market competition as well.
When trade is completely free,  = 1, product market competition reaches its maximum level,
max  (2n  1 + ) =2n. Notice that max has the same functional form as the inverse of the
markup in autarky but with the number of rms doubled. Once established that trade reduces
markups, it is easy to see that trade liberalization has the same e¤ects on selection and innova-
tion as those produced by an exogenous change in the markup in closed economy of proposition
2 shown in gure 1. These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Trade liberalization, both in the form of moving from autarchy to free trade and
reducing variable trade costs, renders markets more competitive lowering markups, 1= , and the
number of operative varieties, M , and increasing the productivity cuto¤, z, and the productivity
growth rate, g .
Similarly to the competition e¤ect in closed economy, the trade-induced competition e¤ect
in open economy can be decomposed into two components: a direct e¤ect induced by changes
in the markup, which can be obtained also in a representative rm economy, and a selection
e¤ect produced by rm heterogeneity. The direct competition e¤ect following trade liberalization
is related to the reduction of oligopolistic ine¢ ciency in the di¤erentiated goods sector, which
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raises the quantity produced by each rm.14 As innovation is cost reducing, the marginal benet
from a reduction in costs is increasing in the quantity produced, therefore lower markups trigger
higher innovation. The selection e¤ect works through exiting of less productive rms triggered
by the reduction in the markup: the market shares of exiting rms are reallocated towards
surviving rms, thus increasing their quantity produced and their incentive to innovate. Thus,
the selection e¤ect of trade liberalization not only raises the level of productivity as in Melitz
(2003) but also its growth rate.
Notice that trade liberalization has an anti-variety e¤ect, it reduces the number of produced
and consumed varieties M . This is a consequence of the assumption that there is a perfect
overlap between the varieties produced by the two economies. The standard pro-variety e¤ect
of trade (e.g. Krugman 1980) could be generated by introducing asymmetry in the set of goods
produced by the two countries. However, a model with asymmetric countries would complicate
the algebra substantially, without adding much to the main mechanism we want to highlight
(the e¤ect of trade-induced selection on innovation and growth).
Proposition 5 The growth e¤ect of moving from autarky to costly or free trade is decreasing
in n. While the growth e¤ect of incremental trade liberalization is increasing in n.
As it can be easily seen from (19), the distance between open and closed economy markups is
decreasing in n. This implies that opening up to trade is more benecial, in terms of productivity
gains, for less competitive countries. On the other hand, di¤erentiating the absolute value of
(19) with respect to n we obtain
@ (j@=@ j)
@n
=
2(   1) (2n  1 + )
n2 (1 + )3
> 0:
Hence, once a country has opened to trade, further reductions in trade costs produce larger
productivity gains the lower the oligopolistic ine¢ ciency in the domestic market. Summarizing,
less competitive closed economies benet more from opening up to trade, and more competitive
open economies experience a higher growth e¤ect of further trade liberalization.
4 Discussion
The channel through which rmsselection operates in this paper is di¤erent from the one in
Melitz (2003). In Melitz, selection happens through the e¤ects of trade on the labor market:
trade liberalization increases labor demand, this bids up wages and the cost of production, thus
forcing the least productive rms to exit the market. In our framework, the wage is constant,
pinned down by the homogeneous good technology, and selection works through the e¤ect of
trade on product market competition: the reduction in the markup rate brought about by trade
reduces prots and pushes the less productive rms out of the market. In Melitz this channel
cannot operate because, under the assumption of monopolistic competition and CES preferences,
14Recall that, since countries are symmetric, rms fully compensate the shares lost in the local market by an
increase in their exports.
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a larger number of competitors does not a¤ect the elasticity of demand. In our oligopolistic model
the market structure is endogenous and trade a¤ects the distribution of surviving rms by raising
competition in the product market. The two papers are complementary in that the wage channel
of rms selection can be easily introduced in our model by removing the homogeneous good and
let the wage be determined endogenously by the equilibrium in the labor market.
Another interesting di¤erence with Melitz is that in his model rm heterogeneity does not
play any role when the economy moves from autarky to free trade (zero trade costs): the e¤ects
of trade are exactly those found in the representative rm version of that model (Krugman,
1980). Firm selection takes place only with incremental trade liberalization (positive trade
costs). In our model instead, the oligopolistic structure implies that rm selection takes place
under radical trade liberalization as well. This happens because opening up to trade reduces
markups even in the extreme case of free trade: the markup increases from its autarky level
1=  n= (n  1 + ) to the free trade level 1=  2n= (2n  1 + ).
Finally, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) features a selection e¤ect of trade through the competi-
tion channel similar to ours, but the source of the endogenous market structure is di¤erent: they
endogenize markups in a monopolistic competitive environment assuming an a non-homothetic
structure of preferences that makes markups dependent on the number of rms (varieties). We
instead, use a general preference structure and markups are pinned down by the strategic inter-
action between oligopolistic producers.
5 Extension: xed export costs and endogenous n
We now explore the implications of extending the baseline model in two directions: endogeniz-
ing the number of rms, n, and allowing for an equilibrium with exporters and non-exporters.
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that exporting rms face not only a variable trade cost but
also a xed export cost x.15 Since the focus is on the e¤ect of trade on the productivity thresh-
old, we keep matters simple by removing innovation. Under this assumption, the equilibrium
distribution is (z) = f(z)=(1 F (z)), as in the benchmark model. Otherwise, the equilibrium
distribution would be endogenous and the problem much harder to solve.
In a model of two symmetric countries, the fundamental di¤erence between exporters and
non-exporters is that the former face tougher competition. In fact, markets for non-exporters
behave as in autarky but markets for exporters behave as under costly trade. The only di¤erence
between them is the markup they face, 1= for non-exporters and 1= for exporters, with  and
 as dened above. Under these assumptions, the exit condition for non exporters is
(1  )e = 
z

1
p
 
1 
; (EC2)
15As in Melitz, this is equivalent to a sunk cost for entering the export market: since productivity is known to
the rm when they decide whether to export or not, rms are indi¤erent on whether to pay a sunk export cost
fex or its annualized value x  fex=( + ). Sunk export costs can be costs of setting distribution channels
abroad, learning about foreign regulatory system, advertising etc.
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where
p =
 


1 
Z zx
z
z(z)dz + 

1 
Z 1
zx
z(z)dz
! 1

;
is a geometric mean of varietiesprices. Notice that when  = , trade is too costly and the
economy remains in autarky with the right-hand-side of (EC2) equal to z=z, as in the baseline
model. There is a similar, new condition for rms participating in international trade
(1   )e = + x
zx

1
p
 
1 
; (XC)
where zx is the cuto¤ productivity for exporters. Variable production costs for non-exporters
~z q = e
1
1  zp

1  and exporters ~z qx = e
1
1 
 zp

1  are derived in the appendix. Exit
conditions (EC2) and (XC) di¤er in two elements: rst, exporters pay both production xed costs
and export xed costs. Second, the markup charged by exporters is smaller, since international
markets are more competitive.
Notice that in our framework, highly productive rms facing international competition may
make smaller prots than less productive local rms facing no international competition. All
varieties are here potentially tradable, but some are not traded because of the xed cost of
export. Firms producing the non traded varieties are protected from international competition
by the export xed cost and benet from larger markups. By combining (EC) and (XC), we get
a linear relation between z and zx
zx
z
=
1  
1  



 
1  + x

: (21)
Notice that the sign of d(zx=z)=d is positive, since it is equal to the sign of    , and
    >     > 0. Moreover, it is also easy to see that zx > z for any  , since this is
clearly true when  =  and then, given that d(zx=z)=d is positive, it has to be true for any
other  >  as well.16 Hence, in our oligopolistic framework no parameter restriction is needed
to obtain the exporters non-exporters partition found in the data, while in the monopolistic
competitive environment of Melitz (2003), the partition can only be obtained with su¢ ciently
high export costs.
So far we have assumed that the number of rms producing a particular variety is exogenous.
Here we extend the model to allow n to be pinned down by an entry condition. Firms entering
the economy are assumed to pay a xed entry cost  > 0 before they observe the productivity
z of the good they will produce. Since prots are linear in productivity, free entry implies that
the expected value of the rm must be equal to the entry cost
(1   (z)) 
(+ )
= ;
where the average prot is given by
 =
Z zx
z
h
(1  )e 1  zp 1    
i
(z)dz +
Z 1
zx
h
(1   )e

1 
 zp

1      x
i
(z)dz (22)
16There is robust evidence that more productive rms self-select into the export market. See for instance,
Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), and Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000).
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which yields the following expression for the free entry condition
(1  )e = +

1  F (zx)
1  F (z)

x +

+ 
1  F (z)

; (FE)
where
 =  (p)

1 
Z zx
z
z(z)dz +  (p )

1 
Z 1
zx
z(z)dz;
is the average markup weighted by the varietiescontribution to the average price.
Finally, in the market clearing condition we have to take into account that not all rms
export, which leads toZ zx
z
h
e
1
1  zp

1  + 
i
(z)dz+
Z 1
zx

e
1
1 
 zp

1  + + x

(z)dz+e+
1 M(z)
M(z)
 =
1
nM(z)
where (1 M(z))=M(z) is the amount of resources devoted to entry. Using (16) and the
denition of  the market clearing condition can be written as
( + )e =
1
nM(z)
 

+

1  F (zx)
1  F (z)

x +

1  F (z)

: (MC2)
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is a vector fz; zx; e; ng solving the system (EC2)-
(XC)-(FE)-(MC2), withM(z) determined by (OV). Since the equilibrium system is fairly com-
plex, we explore its properties numerically in the quantitative section below.
6 Quantitative analysis
The purpose of this section is twofold: rst, we explore the quantitative relevance of our mecha-
nism, calibrating the baseline model and simulating trade liberalization scenarios. We calibrate
the models steady state to match salient aggregate and rm level statistics of the US economy,
then perform a counterfactual exercise analyzing the e¤ects of a 10 percent reduction in the
trade costs  on the innovation rate. Precisely, we quantitatively evaluate the e¤ect of trade
liberalization on innovation due to the direct competition e¤ect , for which rm heterogeneity is
not relevant, and to the selection e¤ect, which pushes growth through a reallocation of market
shares toward more productive rms. Secondly, we explore numerically the equilibrium prop-
erties of the extended version with endogenous n and xed export costs, showing that the core
results of proposition 2 hold in this more sophisticated economy as well.
6.1 Baseline calibration
Although the general analytical results presented above do not require assuming any particular
productivity distribution, in order to perform our quantitative exercise we assume that the
entry distribution is Pareto with shape parameter , and scale zmin. This is consistent with
evidence on rm size distribution (e.g. Axtell, 2001, and Luttmer, 2007). In the baseline model,
we have to calibrate 12 parameters (;  ; ; ; ; n; L; ; ; A; ; zmin). The discount factor  is
equal to the interest rate in steady state, thus we set it to 0:05 following the business cycle
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literature. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) summarize the tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers to trade
using TRAINS (UNCTAD) data: for industrialized countries tari¤s are on average 5% and non
tari¤ barriers are on average 8%. We take the sum of these two costs and set  = 1:13. We set
1= = 1:13 to match a 13 percent markup which is in the range of estimates in Basu (1994).
We use these values of  and  and choose n = 6 such that equation (19) yields  = 0:309 and
therefore an elasticity of substitution across varieties of 1:44, which is in the range of existing
macroeconomic estimates obtained in the international business-cycle literature (e.g. Heatcote
and Perri, 2004, Ruhl, 2008, and Imbs and Mejean, 2009). Using Census 2004 data, we set  =
0:09 to match the average enterprise death rate in manufacturing observed in period 1998-2004.17
Rauch (1999) classies goods into homogeneous and di¤erentiated, and nds that di¤erentiated
goods represents between 64:6 and 67:1 percent of total US manufactures, depending on the
chosen aggregation scheme. We use this result and calibrate the share of di¤erentiated goods
1  = 0:66. We normalize the minimum value of the productivity distribution zmin to 0:1; this
normalization, as we show below, does not a¤ect our quantitative results. Table 1 summarizes
the calibration.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The remaining four parameters (A; ; ; ) are calibrated internally in order to match some
steady-state moments predicted by the model to key rm-level and aggregate statistics. Similarly
to many calibrated models of rm dynamics we target the US economy, for which micro data
are widely available (see i.e. Bernard et al., 2003, Luttmer, 2007, Alessandria-Choi, 2007). We
use four targets, the rst two are the average growth rate of productivity and the investment in
innovation share of GDP. We use data from Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009) where US national
account data have been revised to introduce investment in intangible capital, including R&D.
Moreover, since there is no tangible capital in the model, all statistics used in the calibration
must be adapted to the model economy. Precisely, the growth rate of labor productivity and the
innovation to GDP ratio are obtained by subtracting investment in tangible capital from total
income in the data. After this adjustment, Corrado et al. data report an average growth of
labor productivity of 1:9% a year in the period 1973-2003. Since in the model all investment is in
innovation, the targeted statistics for the innovation to GDP ratio is the investment in intangible
capital share of total income; after subtracting tangible capital this leads to an average of 13:5%
over the period 1973-2003. As shown in the appendix, where a more detailed description of the
calibration strategy can be found, these two statistics are useful for calibrating the technological
parameters A and .
We use two rm-level statistics to calibrate the xed operating costs  and the Pareto shape
coe¢ cient . First, an average rm size of 21:8 workers found in Axtell (2001) for US rms in
1997 using Census data and considering only rms with at least one employee; we use this to
calibrate . Secondly, Bernard, Jensen, Eaton, and Kortum (2003) using 1992 Census data nd a
17For each year the death rates are computed as follows: taking year 2000 as an example, the death rate is the
ratio of rms dead between March 2000 and March 2001 to the total number of rms in March 2000. Data can
be downloaded at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html#ne, le data_uspdf.xls.
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standard deviation of the productivity of US manufacturing rms of 0:75; we use this statistics to
calibrate . Solving the systems of equation matching the data with the corresponding moments
in the model we nd: A = 12:47;  = 0:0119;  = 1:507, and  = 2:621.
6.2 Counterfactuals
In this exercise, we focus on quantifying the growth e¤ect of a 10 percent reduction in the trade
cost  , breaking it down into the direct competition e¤ect and the selection e¤ect highlighted
in the model. For this purpose, let us dene the direct competition e¤ect by di¤erentiating (20)
but keeping the productivity threshold z xed, therefore ignoring the cuto¤ condition and using
the market clearing condition (MCT ) to obtain the e¤ect of  on expenditure e. The resulting
direct competition e¤ect, denoted by dgd , is
dgd 
@g
@
@
@
+
@g
@e
@e
@
@
@
=
 (1  ) Ae
 + (1 + ) 
d
d
; (23)
where @e=@ was calculated using (MCT ) taking z as given, and @=@ is calculated in the
appendix. The selection e¤ect is thus obtained as a residual jdg j = jdg j  
dgd , where dg
results from di¤erentiating of g with respect to  in (20) . We take the absolute values because
trade liberalization implies a reduction in  .
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 shows the e¤ects of a 10 percent reduction in  from its benchmark value of 1:13
to 1:117. It produces a 1:15 percent reduction in the markup. Both the productivity cuto¤
and innovation are fairly sensitive to changes in the markup. In fact the productivity cuto¤ z
rises by 4:21 percent, implying a 10:26 percent reduction in the survival probability of entering
rms, 1   F (z). The growth rate of aggregate productivity increases by 12:98 percent from
0:019 to 0:0214. Using (23) we nd that only about 4 percent of the total increase in growth
can be attributed to the direct e¤ect, while the rest is produced by the selection e¤ect. This
suggests that the main mechanism highlighted in the paper, the innovation e¤ect produced by
the reallocation of market shares from exiting to surviving rms, is quantitatively relevant. In
Table 2, we also show how doubling the benchmark value of parameters a¤ects the results. As
we can see, both the overall growth e¤ect and the growth decomposition are very robust to
parameters changes: the overall growth e¤ect ranges between 0:129 and 0:233 percent increase
in the growth rate, and about 92 to 97 percent of it can be attributed to selection.18
In Table 3 below we compare our results with the ndings of a representative sample of
empirical and quantitative works performing a similar exercise. The scope of this comparison
is twofold: rst, it shows that existing empirical analyses have only studied some but not all
the testable implications that our model can produce. Secondly, it shows that the quantitative
predictions of our stylized model are fairly close to the existing empirical evidence.
18We also perfomed the opposite exercise of halving the benchmark parameters obtaining similar results which
we do not report for brevity.
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Corcos, Del Gatto, Ottaviano and Mion (2007) estimate a version of the Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) model using rm level European data and nd that a 5 percent reduction in trade costs
reduces markups by 1:97 percent. Similarly, Chen, Imbs and Schott (2008) estimating the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model using European manufacturing rm-level data nd that a
10 percent increase in the import to production ratio lowers the average markup by 1 percent.
The elasticity of the markup to trade costs in our benchmark model is in the range of these
two results. Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2010) using Taiwanese data estimate a dynamic structural
model of rms decision to invest in R&D and to participate in the export market, with both
activities a¤ecting the dynamics of productivity. Their counterfactual exercise shows that a 5
percent reduction in the average tari¤ leads to a 5:3 percent increase in productivity in the long
run (after 15 years).
Our ndings are also in line with some recent reduced-form econometric analysis of trade-
induced innovation and selection e¤ects: Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2009) for instance,
nd that a 10 percent increase in Chinese imports is associated with a 1:2 reduction in the prob-
ability of rm survival, a 21:4 percent increase in R&D. They also nd that the selection e¤ect,
the between component, and the direct e¤ect obtained controlling for labor reallocation,
contribute equally to the increase in innovation resulting from increased trade with China. Ad-
ditional evidence is provided by Bustos (2010): using Argentinean rm-level data she nds that
a 24 percent reduction in Brazils tari¤ in the context of the MERCOSUR increased technology
spending by Argentinean rms by an average 24 percent.19
Summarizing, Table 3 provides two insights: rst, it shows that several studies using di¤erent
data and methodologies seem to suggest that the elasticity of the markup to a reduction in trade
costs is the interval between 0:1 and 0:4, and that the elasticity of innovation to a reduction
in trade costs roughly falls in the interval between 1 and 2. Secondly, it shows that none
of the existing empirical works study the joint e¤ect of trade on prices, rm survival, and
innovation. Our dynamic general equilibrium model provides a specic mechanism linking trade-
induced competition, rm selection, and innovation, and allows us to pin down the role of rm
heterogeneity in shaping the e¤ects of trade on productivity growth (growth decomposition).
Hence, the paper lays down a new set of testable implications providing a theoretical guideline
for future empirical work.
6.3 Extension
This section numerically solves the model with endogenous n and xed export costs. The main
purpose of this exercise is to ask whether the basic results of the benchmark model hold in
this richer environment. More precisely, we want to see if trade liberalization still increases
product market competition and triggers rm selection when the number of rms is endogenous
and markups and productivity thresholds are di¤erent for exporters and non-exporters. Since
19Technology spending includes several innovation activities such as R&D, computers, softwares, patents, and
technology transfer.
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the main focus here is qualitative, we do not recalibrate all parameters but take those used in
the benchmark model and calibrate only the two new parameters as follows: the xed cost of
exporting x is set equal to 4:5 in order to match a productivity advantage of exporters of 33
percent, as found by Bernard et al. (2003) in Census 1992 US data. The sunk entry cost  is
set to 0:00309 to generate an equilibrium n = 6 and consequently a 1:13 markup for exporting
rms, the values used in the benchmark calibration. We then perform the same counterfactual
exercise of reducing the trade cost by 10 percent. Figure 2 shows the results.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The three main results are: rstly, trade liberalization has a positive e¤ect on n and a
negative e¤ect on the total number of rms nM . Second, both domestic and foreign markups
are reduced, thus trade liberalization increases competition for both exporters and non-exporters.
Third, tougher competition renders the domestic and the export markets more selective, thus
increasing both productivity cuto¤s.
The key intuition behind these results is that the reduction in variable trade costs reduces
the exportersmarkup, forcing the less productive among them to exit the export market, thus
increasing the productivity cuto¤ zx. The entry decision depends on expected prots which, as
can be seen in (22), are an average of domestic and export prots. From the baseline model
we know that  <  , therefore the prots of exporters are always lower than those of non
exporters. Since from (21) we know that the sign of d(zx=z)=d is positive, a reduction
in  by increasing  and by reducing the share of exporters in the economy, increases the
average prots for entering rms  in (22) thus increasing entry and ultimately leading to a
higher equilibrium number of rms. Moreover, trade-induced increase in competition produces
a reallocation of resources from the homogeneous good to all varieties (exporters and non-
exporters) in the di¤erentiated sector. This has an additional positive e¤ect on the average
prots and induces more entry. A larger n then reduces the domestic markup 1= and raises the
domestic cuto¤ z thereby forcing the least productive domestic rms to exit. Finally, a higher
n also strengthens the reduction in the export markup produced by trade liberalization, thus
further increasing the export cuto¤ zx.
The assumption that the two countries are perfectly symmetric, producing exactly the same
varieties, is key for interpreting these results. A reduction in variable trade costs makes exporting
more protable, intensifying the presence of foreign rm in the domestic markets and viceversa.
This makes the export markets more competitive, reducing export markups and inducing the
marginal exporters to exit the foreign market. Notice that the e¤ect of trade liberalization
on the export cuto¤ zx is di¤erent from that obtained in Melitz (2003). In that paper, as
in Krugman (1980), countries produce and trade di¤erent varieties, implying that there is no
direct competition between domestic and foreign goods. Therefore, reducing trade costs implies
that exporters benet from an expansion of their market which leads to larger prots and
a lower productivity threshold for exporting. Our model can be extended to introduce the
standard pro-variety e¤ect of trade by removing the assumption the two countries produce
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exactly the same goods. As long as there is some overlap between domestic and foreign varieties,
trade liberalization will reduce markups and make the domestic and the foreign markets more
competitive (pro-competitive e¤ect). The domestic cuto¤ will necessarily increase while the
export cuto¤ could go up or down depending on how large is the overlap.
Another interesting result is that although lowering trade costs makes the export market more
competitive, there are more exporters per variety n and each exporter trades more. In Figure
2, we can see that both the total number of domestic rms producing each variety, n, and the
average sales of exporters increase. These two predictions are in line with the empirical evidence
on US rms.20 Interestingly, although trade liberalization increases the level of competition and
reduces markups, there is an indirect market-sizee¤ect that increases average rm size, sales
and prots. Similarly to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the endogenous market structure of our
model implies that trade liberalization has a positive e¤ect on rmsproduction that outweigths
the direct competition e¤ect on prices and markups and allows surviving rms to be bigger, sell
more, and earn higher prots.
Table 4 shows the sensitivity of the results to changes in parameters values.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
As we can see, under all parameters specications we obtain the same qualitative results.
Quantitatively, it is worth noticing that the pro-competitive e¤ect on both the domestic and
the export market is lower with lower rm heterogeneity. Intuitively, a lower dispersion of
rm productivity, higher , reduces the role of trade-induced selection in both markets, a role
that would completely disappear as rms become more homogeneous. Changing the rest of
parameters does not seem to change the quantitative results signicantly.
Finally, although we have simplied the model abstracting from innovation and growth,
this simple comparative statics suggests that the economic mechanism behind the direct and
selection e¤ect of trade are still operative, and might actually be even stronger in the extended
framework. Firstly, the reallocation of market shares from exiting to surviving rms is now
accompanied by an additional reallocation from rms exiting the export market to surviving
exporters. Secondly, the reallocation of market shares from the homogeneous good sector to
all rms producing di¤erentiated goods is still active and is reinforced by the stronger increase
in competition brought about by the increase in the number of rms n. With cost-reducing
innovation these increases in the market share of surviving rms will boost their incentives to
innovate, as in the benchmark model. Although it is fair to say that the qualitative results would
hold in the more general framework, solving for the full model with an endogenous number of
rms, sunk export costs, and innovation could denitively a¤ect the quantitative results. This
is certainly an interesting task for future research.
20Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) nd that a reduction in trade costs increases the volume of export.
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) nd that the number of rms per product increases with a reduction in
trade costs. Although they nd that the number of both exporting rms and products increases, with the former
incresing more than the latter. Below we discuss how our model can be extended to obtain the prediction that
trade liberalization increases the number of products exported as well.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we built a rich but tractable model of trade with heterogeneous rms and cost-
reducing innovation, in order to account for a set of ndings recently emerged from empirical
works on the e¤ects of trade liberalization. In our framework, the competition channel is at the
roots of the selection and innovation e¤ects of trade liberalization, as all other possible channels
(pure market-size, international technology spillovers, terms of trade) have been excluded from
the analysis. The response of market structure to trade liberalization derives directly from
Cournot competition among rms. We have shown that trade liberalization reduces markups,
thus forcing the less productive rms out of the market. This selection e¤ect interacts with rms
innovation choice by redistributing resources towards the more productive rms and increasing
their incentives to innovate, thereby increasing the aggregate long-run investment in innovation.
Calibrating the model to match US rm-level and aggregate statistics we show that the
overall growth e¤ect of a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs is signicant, and it is
mainly attributable to the reallocation of resources across rms of di¤erent productivity levels
triggered by rm selection. This suggests that rm heterogeneity can play a substantial role in
analyzing the innovation and growth e¤ects of trade liberalization.
The innovation e¤ect of trade highlighted in our model suggests the existence of a new
channel of welfare gains that has not been explored in the literature. To keep the model simple
we have limited the analysis to the steady-state. A full understanding of the pro-competitive
dynamic e¤ects of trade requires the analysis of transitional dynamics, which we view as an
interesting task for future research. Finally, studying two perfectly symmetric countries with an
identical set of goods, does not allow us to obtain any pro-variety e¤ects of trade. Introducing
asymmetric countries is another important step for fully exploring the welfare e¤ects of trade
liberalization in our framework.
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A Derivation of equation (11)
Rearranging (8), we obtain x = ~z
1
1  (E=X)
1
1  . Substituting it into (1) yields
X =
0@ MZ
0
~z~j dj
1A1  (E) ;
where ^  =(1  ). Using this into the expression for x above, we nd
x = E
~z=(1 )
MR
0
~z~j dj
:
Substituting these results into (8) and considering that in a symmetric equilibrium x = nq, we
obtain
~z q =

E
znM
1 
q = e
z
z
where e = E=(nM), z  (~zt e gt)^ and the average productivity
z  1
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B Firm problem in open economy
Each rm solves the following problem
Vs = max
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where pj;t; Ej;t and Xj;t are the domestic price, expenditure and total composite good respec-
tively for country j = D;F , and qji is the quantity sold from source country i to destination
country j. Writing down the current-value Hamiltonian and solving it yields the following rst
order conditions "
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Since the two countries are symmetric, qDD;t = q
F
F;t  qt , qFD;t = qDF;t = qt; xD;t = xF;t  xt;
ED;t = EF;t, XD;t = XF;t, pD;t = pF;t. From (24) and (25) and using qt=xt+ qt=xt = 1=n yields
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  1) qt
xt
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)
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which allows us to rewrite (24) and (25) as follows
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Multiplying the above equations by qt and qt and summing up we obtain
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:
Using xt = f[1=~zt ] (Xt =DEt)g
1
 1 , it is easy to prove that (xt=Xt)
 = ezt. From (28) and using
qt=xt+ qt=xt = 1=n we obtain
qt +  qt
~zt
= et
z
z
(30)
where
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2n  1 + 
n (1 + )2 (1  )

2 (1  n  ) + n (2   1) + 1  
is the inverse of the markup in the open economy.
C Exit in open economy
The productivity cuto¤ is determined solving the following equation
t(~z
) =

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~zt

qt +

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
qt   ht    = 0
Using pt = 1=D~z

D;t and ht = et~zt   (+ ) =A obtained from (26) and (27) yields
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With the same procedure used to derive (30) we obtain
qt + qt
~zt
= Det zt=zt
which, together with (30), yields
[1  (1 + )  ] etzt =zt +
+ 
A
   = 0:
This expression is similar to (EC) except for the markup 1= in the place of 1=.
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D Pro-competitive e¤ect
Di¤erentiating  with respect to 
@
@
=  2(   1) (2n  1 + )
2
n (1 + )3 (1  )  0;
thus trade liberalization reduces the markup. Moreover, taking the absolute value of this deriv-
ative and di¤erentiating it with respect to n we nd
@
 @T =@ 
@n
=
2(   1) (2n  1 + )
n2 (1 + )3
> 0;
which implies that the competition e¤ect of incremental trade liberalization is decreasing in the
number of rms n.
E Calibration
Let us denote the vector of externally calibrated parameters with 
 and solve the equilibrium
system (EC)-(MC) to obtain e and z as functions of 
 and the four parameters that we have
to calibrate, A, , , . Let us call  = (A; ; ; ; zmin) the vector of parameters calibrated
internally. We then use the moments in the model corresponding to the statistics we want to
match. The rst moment is the average growth rate of production
gq = g (1  ) =  [Ae (
;)    ] (1  )
obtained from (20) and using the production function (2) and the fact that a share  of the
economy does not innovate. Similarly the innovation share of income in our model is
r =
e (
;)  +A
e (
;) (1 + )nM
where from (13) we know that the resources devoted to innovation by rm z are h(z) = gz=Az,
thus average innovation is h = e (
;) z   (+ ) =A. These two moments are relevant
for the calibration of A and , since these are technological parameters a¤ecting the return to
innovation.
From (2) we obtain the average rm size
y = e (
;) + 
which is relevant in calibrating the xed cost . Finally, a relevant moment in calibrating the
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution of rm productivity , is the standard deviation of
rm productivity
stdz =
z(
;)
1
2
(  1) (  2) 12
where we can use (EC) and (MC) to express z(
;) as a function of parameters. Using the
statistics discussed in the text, namely gq = 0:019, r = 13:5, y = 21:8 and stdz = 0:75, this
system of equations is used to calibrate the vector of parameters  = (A; ; ; ) obtaining the
results shown in the main text.
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F Equilibrium quantity for exporters and non-exporters
We want to derive the variable costs (or productivity-adjusted quantitites) for non-exporters
~z q and exporters ~z qx. Proceeding as in the benchmark model, from (8) we obtain x =
~z ^ (E=X)
1
1  and substituting into (1) yields (x=X) = 

1  z=M p. Substituting this back
into (8) we obtain
~z q = 
1
1  ezp

1 
where e = E=nM and z is a measure of detrended productivity, ze^gt = ~z^t . With the same
procedure we obtain the productivity-adjusted quantity for exporters
~z qx = 
1
1 
 ezp

1  :
Using these two results we can easily determine the domestic cuto¤ condition (EC2) and the
export cuto¤ condition (XC).
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Table 1
Summary of calibration
parameter value moment Source
 0:309 Elasticity of sub/markup Ruhl (2008)
 1:13 Trade cost Anderson-Wicoop(2004)
 0:09 Enterprise death rate US Census (2004)
 0:34 Share non di¤erentiated Rauch (1999)
n 6 Elasticity of sub/markup Basu (1994)
 0:05 interest rate Mehra-Prescott (2005)
A 12:47 Innovation/GDP, Growth CHS(2009)
 0:0119 Innovation/GDP, Growth CHS (2009)
 1:507 avg. rm size Axtell (2001)
 2:621 std. rm productivity BJEK (2003)
Table 2
Sensitivity analysis
(doubling the benchmark)
bench n = 12  = 5:24  = 3  = 0:68  = 0:18  = 0:0218
1= markup  0:0115  0:0252  0:0115  0:0115  0:0115  0:0115  0:0115
z cuto¤ 0:0421 0:0702 0:0206 0:0420 0:0418 0:0421 0:0471
1  F (z) survival  0:1026  0:1630  0:1013  0:1023  0:1019  0:1026  0:1137
y size 0:1148 0:1965 0:1124 0:1148 0:1148 0:1147 0:1287
jdg j growth 0:1298 0:2334 0:1320 0:1265 0:1298 0:1345 0:1428dgd  direct 4:2% 5:1 4:1 4:3 3:1 4 7:7
jdg j selection 95:8% 94:9 95:9 95:7 96:9 96 92:3
Benchmark: n = 6; = 2:62;  = 1:5017;  = 0:34;  = 0:09;  = 0:0109
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Table 3
Comparison with empirical evidence
Moments model CIS CDMO BDV ARX BUS
1=  0:0115  0:01  0:019
1  F (z)  0:1026  0:012
jdg j 0:1298 0:24 0:053 0:24dgd  4:2% 50%
jdg j 95:8% 50%
Sources : Chen et al: (2008);Corcos et al: (2007);Bloom et al: (2009)
Aw et al: (2010);Bustos (2010)
Table 4
Sensitivity analysis: extended model
(doubling the benchmark)
bench  = 3  = 0:68  = 0:18  =0:0061  = 5:24
1= markup D  0:0004  0:0003  0:0005  0:0002  0:0005  0:00007
1= markup EX  0:0116  0:0109  0:0103  0:0128  0:0082  0:0085
z cuto¤ D 0:0026 0:0023 0:00288 0:0017 0:0023 0:00015
zx cuto¤ EX 0:0931 0:0874 0:0817 0:1034 0:0609 0:0645
n rms 0:0032 0:0027 0:0036 0:0019 0:0030 0:00039
nM total rms  0:0068  0:0062  0:0074  0:0045  0:0061  0:00078
sx avg. sales EX 0:1272 0:1567 0:1002 0:1501 0:0640 0:0644
Benchmark:  = 2:62;  = 1:5017;  = 0:34;  = 0:09;= 0:00309
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Figure 1. Steady-state equilibrium
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Figure 2: Trade liberalization with endogenous n and xed export costs
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